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Attacks on Public-Sector Bargaining as 
Attacks on Employee Voice: A (Partial) 
Defence of the Wagner Act Model
Joseph slater *
the attacks on public-sector union rights in the United states that began in 2011 are one 
of the most important developments in labour law in recent memory. these events shed 
light on employee voice issues, and on the continuing viability of the “Wagner act” model. 
While declining union density rates in the private sector have prompted some to question 
this model, high-density rates in the public sector show that unions can flourish under it. 
this article gives an overview of public-sector unions in the Us and summarizes the recent 
attacks on their rights. It then addresses rulings in both Missouri and Canada that found 
constitutional rights to collective bargaining, decisions that leave those rights intriguingly 
undefined. It concludes that advocates of employee voice should understand that, in the 
current political climate, those unsympathetic to employee voice will have significant clout in 
developing alternatives to the Wagner act model.
l’érosion des droits syndicaux du secteur public des États-Unis, qui a débuté en 2011, constitue 
de mémoire récente l’une des principales transformations du droit du travail. les événements 
qui en ont découlé ont mis en lumière l’affaiblissement, pour les employés, des moyens de 
se faire entendre et mis en doute la viabilité du modèle de la « Wagner act ». alors que le 
déclin du taux de syndicalisation du secteur privé en porte plusieurs à douter de ce modèle, 
la forte syndicalisation du secteur public démontre qu’il permet aux syndicats de s’épanouir. 
Cet article donne un aperçu de la situation des syndicats du secteur public aux États-Unis 
et résume le récentes attaques à l’encontre de leurs droits. Il se penche ensuite sur des 
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Workshop (16-17 March 2012), hosted at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
Toronto and funded by the Leverhulme Trust, the Centre for Labour Management Relations 
at Ryerson University, and Osgoode Hall Law School. The author would like to thank 
the organizers of the Voices at Work conference in Toronto for inviting me to be part of a 
wonderful and informative project, especially Sara Slinn and Eric Tucker for managing the 
publication process, the outside reviewers who gave me many useful comments, and Chris 
Sawan for his work as a research assistant.
(2013) 50 osgoode Hall law Journal876
jugements qui, au Missouri et au Canada, ont conclu qu’il existe un droit constitutionnel à la 
négociation collective, décisions qui curieusement omettent de définir ces droits. Il conclut 
que les défenseurs du droit d’expression des employés devraient comprendre que, dans le 
climat politique actuel, les opposants au droit d’expression des employés disposeront d’une 
influence considérable pour trouver des solutions de rechange au modèle de la Wagner Act.
ThE ATTAckS on PuBlic-SEcTor collective bargaining rights in the United 
States that began in early 2011 have arguably been some of the most important 
developments in labour law in recent memory. While the most famous and 
radical moves took place in Wisconsin and Ohio, over a dozen states have enacted 
significant restrictions on the rights of government employees and their unions.1 
This is significant both because public-sector workers now comprise more than 
half the total number of union members in the United States2 and because of the 
broader political implications of “defunding” and otherwise crippling a major 
1. See Joseph E Slater, “Public-Sector Labor in the Age of Obama” (2012) 87:1 Ind LJ 189 at 
203-12 [Slater, “Public-Sector Labor”]. See Part III, below, for an updated list of recent laws 
restricting public-sector collective bargaining.
2. In 2011, 7.6 million public employees belonged to a union; the private sector figure was 
7.2 million. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, USDL-12-0094, “Union Members 
Summary” (27 January 2012), online: United States Department of Labor <http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm> [Union Members Summary].
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constituent of the Democratic Party.3 While the attacks have prompted some 
backlash (notably, Ohio rejected its anti-union bill in a voter referendum4), states 
continue to consider anti-union legislation.5
Political debates over these laws have focussed on economic arguments: 
whether public employees are or are not overpaid compared to comparable 
private-sector employees; the relationship (if any) between collective bargain-
ing rights and state budgets; and union effects on employer efficiency. I have 
addressed these issues elsewhere, concluding that these arguments in favour of 
radically reducing collective bargaining rights of public workers are unconvincing.6 
For example, a careful review of all the relevant literature reveals that the majority 
of studies have found that public-sector workers are not overpaid compared to 
comparable private sector workers.7
Within academia, arguments have focused on whether the old thesis from 
Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter’s The Unions and the Cities8 deserves exhuming: 
that collective bargaining gives public workers too much power through “two 
bites of the apple” (bargaining and lobbying). Again, I have argued against this 
position elsewhere.9
3. See Glen M Vogel, “Clinton, Campaigns, and Corporate Expenditures: The Supreme Court’s 
Recent Decision in Citizen’s United and its Impact on Corporate Political Influence,” (2012) 
86:1 St John’s L Rev 183 at 207 (“nine out of ten dollars spent on elections by unions goes to 
Democrats”).
4. Sabrina Tavernise, “Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting Unions’ Rights” The New York Times (9 
November 2011) A1, online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/politics/ohio-turns-
back-a-law-limiting-unions-rights.html>.
5. See Part III, below. For even more recent attempts by state legislatures to limit the ability of 
unions to collect and use dues money, see Ann C Hodges, “Maintaining Union Resources in 
an Era of Public Sector Bargaining Retrenchment” (2012) 16 Employee Rts & Employment 
Pol’y J 599.
6. See Joseph E Slater, “The Rise and Fall of SB-5: The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in 
Historical and Political Context” (2012) 43:3 Toledo L Rev 473 [Slater, “Rise and Fall”]; 
Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” supra note 1; Joseph E Slater, “The Assault on Public-Sector 
Collective Bargaining: Real Harms and Imaginary Benefits” (2011), online: American 
Constitutional Society for Law and Policy <http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Slater_
Collective_Bargaining.pdf>.
7. For an overview of major pay studies demonstrating this, see Joseph E Slater & Elijah 
Welenc, “Are Public-Sector Employees ‘Overpaid’ Relative to Private-Sector Employees? An 
Overview of the Studies” Washburn LJ [forthcoming in 2013].
8. Harry H Wellington & Ralph K Winter, The Unions and The Cities (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1972).
9. See e.g. John O McGinnis & Max Schanzenbach, “The Case Against Public Sector Unions” 
[2010] Policy Review 162, online: Hoover Institution <http://www.hoover.org/publications/
policy-review/article/43266>. For a rebuttal, see Slater, “Rise and Fall,” supra note 6.
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In these debates, not enough has been said about the importance of employee 
voice. The public sector can offer interesting insights on this topic.10 Public-sector 
labour laws vary widely—notably, but not exclusively, in terms of which types of 
employees have collective bargaining rights, what subjects unions have a right to 
negotiate, and how bargaining impasses are resolved.11 Each of these affects the 
degree to which employees are likely to have effective voice in their work relations. 
Laws slashing or eliminating collective bargaining rights of public employees will 
almost certainly diminish such voice significantly. This is an independent reason 
to oppose such laws.
Additionally, the debate over public-sector unions casts in a different light an 
issue central to the Voices at Work project12 and broader debates over the future 
of labour law: the continuing viability of the “Wagner Act” model, including its 
use of majority, exclusive representation.13 The declining and now shockingly 
low union density rates in the US private sector have prompted some scholars to 
question the utility of this model.14 On the other hand, the successes of public-
sector unions—high union density and in some cases political clout—show that 
unions can flourish under this model. Indeed, it was these very successes that 
motivated the recent attacks on their rights.
Of course, the private sector and the public sector differ in important ways. 
In the United States, private-sector labour law is set by two federal statutes, the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)15 and the Railway Labor Act,16 which 
10. See Joseph E Slater, “Employee Voice: Lessons from the Public Sector” (2011) 94:3 Marq L 
Rev 917 [Slater, “Employee Voice”].
11. See generally, Martin H Malin, Ann C Hodges & Joseph E Slater, Public Sector Employment: 
Cases and Materials, 2d ed (St Paul, MN: West, 2011).
12. For a description of this project, see Alan Bogg & Tonia Novitz, “Investigating ‘Voice’ at 
Work” (2012) 33:3 Comp Lab LJ 323.
13. The “Wagner Act” was the original National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935, before 
later amendments, now codified at 29 USC §§ 151-69.  It was named after its main author 
and sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner.  Under the original Wagner Act and the current 
NLRA, unions are certified under a “majority, exclusive representative” model:  in order to 
be certified, a union must show that a majority of the relevant group of employees desires 
the union to represent them, and if certified, the union becomes the exclusive representative 
for the entire relevant group of employees in matters concerning wages, hours, and working 
conditions.  See e.g. NLRA § 9(a).
14. See e.g. Charles J Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the 
American Workplace, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Catherine Fisk & Xenia 
Tashlitsky, “Imagine a World Where Employers are Required to Bargain with Minority 
Unions” (2011) 27 ABA J Lab & Emp L 1.
15. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC § 151-69 (2012).
16. Railway Labor Act, 45 USC § 151-88 (2012).
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permit little local variation.17 Public-sector law in the United States, on the 
other hand, is mainly composed of a wide variety of state and local laws. Also, 
private employers in the United States routinely conduct extensive and aggressive 
anti-union campaigns that often feature explicitly illegal conduct; this practice is 
much less common in the public sector.18 In some cases, the “market” in which 
public employers and employees function can differ significantly (although with 
severe public budget cuts, anti-tax movements, and privatization drives, the 
differences are often not as great as claimed). So, one must be careful in making 
broad comparisons.
Still, recent events show that rejecting parts of the Wagner Act model does 
not necessarily improve prospects for unions or worker voice. Indeed, the radical 
restructuring of many public-sector labour laws was clearly intended to limit 
worker voice, regardless of how one defines that term.19 Also, recent events in 
Canada and Missouri shed light on this issue. In 2007, courts in Canada and 
the state of Missouri found a constitutional right to some form of collective 
bargaining.20 As discussed below, in both instances, it remains unclear exactly 
what type of union rights are guaranteed. Yet in both instances, one can see 
examples of alternatives to the Wagner Act model that were not designed to 
facilitate employee voice.
This article first gives an overview of public-sector unions in the United 
States. It then summarizes the recent wave of attacks on public-sector collective 
bargaining rights. Next, it discusses these attacks in the context of employee voice. 
It then addresses developments under the constitutional rulings in Missouri and 
Canada. It concludes that advocates of employee voice should understand that 
in the current political climate, those unsympathetic to employee voice will have 
significant clout in developing alternatives to the Wagner Act model. This 
understanding should inform legal arguments in actual cases, political activity, 
and academic theory.
17. The only permitted variation under the NLRA is that states may vote to make union security 
clauses illegal (the so-called “right-to-work” option) under NLRA §14(b), added by the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947.
18. See Joseph E Slater, “The ‘American Rule’ That Swallows the Exception” (2007) 11 Employee 
Rts & Employment Pol’y J 53 at 90-93 [Slater, “The ‘American Rule’”].
19. For a description of the political context of these laws, see Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” supra 
note 1 at 192-94. In short, attacks on public workers as over-paid and over-privileged.
20. See Part IV, below.
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i. PuBlic-SEcTor lABour unionS ArE A cEnTrAl PArT 
of ThE uS lABour MoVEMEnT
For decades, public workers in the United States have organized at comparatively high 
rates: In 2011, 40 per cent of all public employees were unionized.21 Combined 
with declining unionization rates in the private sector, these trends meant that by 
2009 public-sector workers had become a majority of all US union members.22
Notably, this success occurred under laws that, generally speaking, are more 
restrictive than private-sector labour law. A minority of states do not permit any 
public employees to bargain, and another minority only permits a few types of 
public employees to bargain. By the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, thirty states and the District of Columbia allowed collective bargaining 
for all major groups of public employees, twelve states allowed only one to four 
types of public workers to bargain (most commonly teachers and firefighters), 
and eight did not allow any public workers to bargain.23 For public employees 
who are allowed to bargain, the scope of bargaining is generally narrower—
sometimes quite a bit narrower—than in the private sector. The majority of states 
do not allow any public employee to strike, and while most states that provide 
collective bargaining rights to public employees allow some form of binding 
“interest arbitration” to settle contract disputes, some states only allow voluntary 
arbitration, non-binding arbitration, mediation, or fact-finding.24
Nonetheless, even before the 1960s, when public employees in the United 
States had no right to bargain collectively, many public employees organized 
into unions. Some of these unions forged informal agreements with public 
employers over terms of employment.25 In more recent decades, public employees 
21. Union Members Summary, supra note 2.
22. In 2009, 37.4 per cent of public employees were members of unions, and 41.1 per cent were 
covered by union contracts. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release “Union Members 
Summary” (27 January 2012), online: United States Department of Labor <http://www.
bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm> [Union Membership Table 3]. During the same year, 
7.9 million public workers and 7.4 million private sector workers were union members. See 
Union Members Summary, supra note 2.
23. Richard C Kearney, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 4th ed (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
2009) at 62-64. This counts four states with what is called “meet and confer” provisions 
as collective bargaining states. “Meet and confer” can be a weaker right than collective 
bargaining, chiefly in not requiring a duty to bargain in good faith. See Malin, Hodges & 
Slater, supra note 11 at 414-15.
24. Kearney, supra note 23 at 233-34, 259-60.
25. See Joseph E Slater, Public Workers: Government Employee Unions, the Law and the State 1900-
1962, (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2004) [Slater, Public Workers].
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have continued to unionize in states where they have no statutory right to 
bargain collectively.26
ii. PuBlic-SEcTor unionS AnD ThE DESirE for 
EMPloyEE VoicE
Why this organization when the rights given to unions are comparatively limited? 
Public employees organize into unions at least in part to exercise employee voice, 
not merely to bargain wages and job security. Today, for example, federal employees 
are unionized at a relatively high rate,27 despite the fact that the vast majority of 
them may not bargain over any part of their compensation (wages or benefits), 
or a number of other important topics.28 Also, they and other public employees 
continue to organize even though at least most public workers throughout the 
country already have “just-cause” discharge protection through civil service 
statutes.29 Nor do all public-sector unions exercise significant political power; 
many clearly do not. Thus, it appears that a significant reason that public employees 
organize into unions is to gain some voice in their day-to-day workplace relations.
The question of what, exactly, “employee voice” means or should mean has 
been explored in recent years by various scholars. Alan Bogg and Tonia Norvitz 
gave an excellent overview of the questions and issues involved in defining 
“employee voice” in their article from the first Voices at Work conference.30 Does, 
or should, “voice” refer more to economic and related issues at the workplace, 
or broader social and political objectives? To what extent does the “exclusive 
representative” model allow effective voice through increased bargaining power, 
and to what extent does it inhibit competing voices of different workers within a 
union bargaining unit? If one goal of employee voice is to further democracy and 
26. Ann C Hodges, “Lessons From the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector 
Labor Law Spectrum” (2009) 18:3 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 735.
27. In 2011, 31.4 per cent of federal employees were covered by a union contract. Union 
Membership Table 3, supra note 22.
28. Most federal employees are covered by the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act 
of 1978. See 5 USC § 7101-135 (2012). This statute makes compensation a prohibited 
topic of bargaining. (Ibid), §§ 7102, 7103(14). It also makes security agreements illegal. See 
SEIU, AFL-CIO, Local 556 & Dep’t of Army, 1 FLRA 562, 564 (2012), which makes the 
unionization rates in the federal sector even more remarkable.
29. Malin, Hodges & Slater, supra note 11 at 134-62.
30. Bogg & Novitz, supra note 12.
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democratic forms, is it better to encourage employees to act through unions as a 
constituent group in a system of industrial pluralism, or should we focus instead 
on internal democracy within unions and the sometimes divergent interests of 
different groups of workers? Does it matter whether certain types of “voice” are 
more or less advantageous to employers in bringing efficiency to the enterprise? 
How do specific legal forms help to further or inhibit employee voice, and how 
could this, or other aspects of employee voice, be measured?31
These are fascinating and important questions, but they need not be resolved 
in this article. However one defines employee voice, it is clear that the attacks on 
public-sector collective bargaining rights in the United States were designed to 
limit it. Proponents of these bills insisted that public-sector unions (and government 
employees generally) had too much power, both at the workplace and politically. 
One suspects that the true motivations of many such proponents were largely 
partisan: Unions tend to support politicians in the Democratic Party, and these 
laws were promoted almost exclusively by Republican elected officials.32 In any 
event, the point here is to stress the sad significance of these radical changes 
designed to gut employee voice, and to sound a warning about adopting new, 
possibly radical, alternatives in this political climate.
iii. ATTAckS on PuBlic-SEcTor collEcTiVE BArgAining 
righTS BEginning in 2011
While public-sector labour statutes change much more frequently than do private-
sector ones, 2011 was the most significant year in this regard in at least several 
decades. The changes (or, in the cases of Ohio and Idaho, changes later revoked) 
that continued into 2012 and beyond are summarized below. In this list, 
Wisconsin and Ohio are first, because they were the most far-reaching attempts 
to cripple bargaining rights. The remaining state laws, all still quite significant, 
are listed in alphabetical order. In all instances, these laws either restricted or 
eliminated collective bargaining rights of the public employees affected.
The summary is limited to laws on collective bargaining. It does not 
include laws that cut pension benefits for public workers, although it is worth 
noting that in 2010 and 2011, forty-one states enacted significant changes to 
their public-sector pension statutes. The changes in pension laws all resulted in 
31. Ibid.
32. See e.g. Paul M Secunda, “The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011” (2012) 27 
ABA J Lab & Emp L 293; Slater, “Rise and Fall,” supra note 6; Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” 
supra note 1 at 192-215.
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reduced benefits, reduced coverage, or both. It is also worth noting that in almost 
all jurisdictions, pension benefits and formulas for public employees are set by a 
separate statute and are not subject to union negotiations.33 Also excluded from 
the summary are laws, passed recently in states that do not permit collective 
bargaining, limiting or barring payroll deductions for organizations that engage 
in political activity (a move clearly aimed at unions).34
A. WiSconSin
Before 2011, Wisconsin had two similar public-sector labour statutes, one covering 
local and county government employees35 and the other state employees.36 The 
former was initially enacted in 1959. It was, perhaps ironically, the first state law 
in the United States permitting public-sector collective bargaining.
The Budget Repair Bill, Act 10, signed by Governor Scott Walker in 
2011, made huge changes to these laws, although it exempted employees 
in “protective occupations” (mainly police and fire).37 First, Act 10 eliminates 
collective bargaining rights entirely for some employees: University of Wisconsin 
(UW) system employees, employees of the UW Hospitals and Clinics Authority, 
and certain home care and childcare providers.38 Second, the Act limits the scope 
of bargaining (what unions are legally entitled to negotiate) to a percentage of 
total “base wages.”39 Even this sole permissible topic is limited to an increase no 
greater than the percentage change in the consumer price index. The Act expressly 
excludes other topics from bargaining, including overtime, premium pay, merit 
pay, performance pay, supplemental pay, and pay progressions. No other issues 
may be negotiated. The Act prohibits collective bargaining on any other topic 
even if the employer is willing to bargain.40
Third, the Act bars interest arbitration for all public employees (again, 
except for the public safety employees who are generally excluded from the Act’s 
provisions).41 Interest arbitration is a method for resolving bargaining impasses 
and is frequently used in US public-sector labour law. It is meant to substitute for 
33. Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” supra note 1 at 194, 197-98.
34. See e.g. 2010 Alabama Act 761; The Protect Arizona Employees’ Paychecks from Politics Act, c 
251, 2011 Arizona Sessions Laws 251; 2012 North Carolina Session Law 1, c 1.
35. Wis Stat Ann, § 111.70 (2013) [Wis Stat Ann].
36. Ibid, § 111.81.
37. Wis Act 10, § 216 (2011) (codified at Wis Stat § 111.70(1)(mm)).
38. Ibid, §§ 265, 279, 280.
39. Ibid, § 315.
40. Ibid, § 169.
41. Ibid, § 234.
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strikes, which are barred for many government employees, even in the majority 
of states that permit public-sector collective bargaining. Interest arbitration is 
usually the final step in a series of statutorily mandated impasse processes (often 
including mediation and fact-finding). Interest arbitration involves an arbitrator 
(or sometimes an arbitration panel) issuing a decision that resolves all the issues 
in a labour contract that were at impasse. The arbitrator uses criteria set out by 
the relevant public-sector labour statute.42 Although the new Wisconsin law does 
away with interest arbitration, it does not provide a specific replacement procedure 
to resolve bargaining impasses.
Act 10 also imposes an unprecedented mandatory recertification system that 
requires every public sector union to face a recertification election every year, 
whether or not any employee requests one. Under this system, a union is only 
recertified if 51 per cent of the employees in the collective bargaining unit—not 
merely those voting—vote for recertification.43 So, for example, if a bargaining 
unit has 400 members, and the recertification vote is 201 favouring union repre-
sentation and 100 opposing it, the union will be de-certified (because 201 is less 
than 51 per cent of 400). The bill also limits the duration of collective bargaining 
agreements to one year.44
The law also makes Wisconsin a “right to work” jurisdiction by making 
union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements illegal.45 Further, the 
law makes it illegal for an employer to agree to automatic dues deductions, even 
for employees who wish to pay dues.46
Unions have challenged Act 10 in court. While a federal district court held 
that the recertification and dues check-off provisions were unconstitutional under 
a combination of the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment,47 
the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and upheld Act 10 
in full.48
Still, the Seventh Circuit’s description of the motivations of proponents of 
Act 10 is noteworthy here. Although not sufficient, in the court’s view, to invalidate 
the bill on constitutional grounds, the court did note the motive of limiting the 
voice of unions who supported the Democratic Party. The Court explained:
42. Malin, Hodges & Slater, supra note 11 at 615-74.
43. Wis Stat Ann, supra note 35, § 111.70(4)(d)(2)(a).
44. Ibid, § 111.70(4)(cm)(8m).
45. See The Budget Repair Bill, Wis Act 10, § 219 (2011).
46. Ibid, § 227.
47. Wisconsin Educ Ass’n Council v Walker, 824 F Supp (2d) 856, 192 LRRM 3299 (WD Wisc 
2012).
48. Wisconsin Educ Ass’n Council v Walker, 705 F (3d) 640, 194 LRRM 3110 (7th Cir 2013).
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Admittedly, the Unions do offer some evidence of viewpoint discrimination in the 
words of then-Senate Majority Leader Scott Fitzgerald suggesting Act 10, by limit-
ing unions’ fundraising capacity, would make it more difficult for President Obama 
to carry Wisconsin in the 2012 presidential election. While Senator Fitzgerald’s 
statement may not reflect the highest of intentions, his sentiments do not invalidate 
an otherwise constitutional, viewpoint neutral law. Consequently, Act 10’s prohibition 
on payroll dues deduction does not violate the First Amendment.49
B. ohio
In the early 1980s, Ohio enacted a public-sector labour law applicable to most 
public employees, which even allows most public workers to strike.50 In 2011, 
Governor John Kasich signed SB-5, a bill designed to alter this law profoundly.51 
But SB-5 never went into effect. Ohio law permits recently enacted legislation 
to be “put on hold” pending a voter referendum on whether to reject the law, 
if enough signatures are gathered requesting this. Pursuant to this procedure, 
SB-5 was put on hold pending a voter referendum in November 2011 and was 
rejected soundly in that referendum (the vote was approximately 61 per cent 
to 39 per cent).52
Notably, SB-5 was nearly as radical as Act 10 in Wisconsin. Among other 
things, SB-5 would have eliminated collective bargaining rights for certain 
employees, including at least most college and university faculty, lower level 
supervisors in police and fire departments, and employees of charter schools.53 
SB-5 also would have imposed “right to work” rules and barred public employers 
from agreeing to provide payroll deductions for any contributions to a political 
action committee without written authorization from the individual employee.54 
It would also have greatly restricted the scope of bargaining, and made a number 
of other changes restricting or eliminating union rights.55
For employees who were permitted to bargain, SB-5 would have eliminated 
both the right to strike for those who had that right (all covered employees with 
the exception of police, fire, and a few other small categories), and the right to 
binding interest arbitration at impasse for employees who had no right to strike. 
49. Ibid at para 1.
50. Ohio Rev Code, c 4117.1-4117.24.
51. Am Sub SB 5 (2011), §§ 1-6, 2011 Ohio Laws 1 (repealed 2011) [SB-5].
52. For a more detailed explanation of the provisions of SB-5 and the politics surrounding it, see 
Slater, “Rise and Fall,” supra note 6.
53. SB-5, supra note 51. See also ibid.
54. SB-5, supra note 51, § 1.
55. Ibid, §§ 1-6.
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Instead, the parties would have been left to mediation and fact-finding. If the 
non-binding mediation and fact-finding did not produce an agreement—and 
either the employer or a majority of the union could have rejected the fact-
finder’s report—then the governing legislative body (often the employer itself ), 
could have chosen the employer’s final offer.56
SB-5 added various additional restrictions to the impasse procedure, all 
favouring the employer. Even within the negotiating and fact-finding process, 
SB-5 would have required that, in determining the employer’s “ability to pay” 
(a statutory factor that fact-finders already had to consider under existing law), 
only the financial status of the public employer at the time of negotiations could 
be considered; future potential revenue increases from levies and bonds could 
not.57 Also, under SB-5, for certain employers (not the state or state universities), 
if the legislative body selected the last best offer that cost more, and the Chief 
Financial Officer of the legislative body did not determine whether sufficient 
funds existed to cover the contract, the last best offers could have been submitted 
to the voters.58
c. iDAho
Idaho enacted SB-1108, which limited collective bargaining by teachers to 
“compensation” (defined, essentially, as wages and benefits, including insurance, 
leave time, and sick leave).59 The law eliminated mandatory fact-finding.60 Fact-
finding is another process commonly used in US public-sector labour laws to 
help resolve bargaining impasses, typically after mediation and before interest 
arbitration. In fact-finding, an individual “fact-finder” (or sometimes a panel) 
investigates and makes findings regarding facts relevant to the issues at impasse 
(e.g., regarding the public employer’s budget and resources, and how much 
comparable public employees are paid in comparable jurisdictions).61 Under 
this law, only mediation remained, and even this was limited: If the parties 
did not reach an agreement, they were permitted, but not required, to enter 
into mediation.62 The law also limited collective bargaining agreements to 




59. Idaho SB 1108 (2011), §17 [Idaho SB-1108].
60. Ibid, § 22.
61. Malin, Hodges & Slater, supra note 11 at 614-15.
62. Idaho SB-1108, supra note 59, § 20.
63. Ibid, § 22. An “evergreen clause” is a term in a collective bargaining agreement providing 
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the parties did not reach an agreement by 10 June of each year, the school board 
would unilaterally set the terms of employment for the coming school year.64
Subsequently, though, this law was reversed by a voter referendum, similar to 
what took place in Ohio. In the November 2012 elections, Idaho voters rejected 
the changes made by SB-1108 in three ballot proposals.65
D. illinoiS
In SB-7, Illinois amended its Educational Labor Relations Act such that, in the 
Chicago Public Schools, the length of the school day and school year are permissive, 
not mandatory, subjects of bargaining.66 In other words, public employers need 
only negotiate about such issues if they wish. They are not obligated to do so, 
and the union may not strike or invoke any impasse resolution procedures 
(mediation, fact-finding, or interest arbitration) over such issues.
This law also made minor adjustments to the right to strike for most public 
education employees, and imposed significant restrictions on Chicago Public 
Schools employees’ right to strike. For schools other than Chicago schools, if 
the parties have not reached an agreement within forty-five days of the start of 
the school year, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board must invoke 
mediation.67 After fifteen days of mediation, either party is allowed to declare an 
impasse. Seven days after that, each party must submit its final offer. Seven days 
later, the offers are made public. No strike is allowed until at least fourteen days 
after publication of the final offer.
For Chicago schools, if mediation fails to produce an agreement after a 
reasonable period, either party has a right to fact-finding.68 If this does not 
produce a settlement within seventy-five days, the fact-finder will issue a private 
report with recommendations. The parties have up to fifteen days to accept or 
reject the recommendations. If the recommendations are rejected, they are made 
public. The union may not strike until thirty days after the publication of the 
recommendations, and even then may strike only if at least 75 per cent of the 
bargaining unit authorizes the strike.
that when the agreement expires, the terms of the agreement remain in effect until it is 
renegotiated.
64. Ibid, § 20.
65. See Amy Linn, “Idaho Voters Say No to GOP-Backed School Overhaul, Anti-Union 
Measures,” (2012) 50 GERR 1402 (BNA).
66. Ill SB 7 (2011), § 7.
67. Ibid, § 13(b)(2).
68. Ibid, § 13(b)(2.10).
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E. inDiAnA
Indiana Senate enrolled Act 575 limits the scope of bargaining for teachers to 
salary, wages, and certain fringe benefits.69 The law explicitly bars negotiation 
over practically all other subjects, including the school calendar and criteria for 
teacher evaluation and dismissal.70 Even as to wages and benefits, the law forbids 
contracts that would put a school district in a deficit.71 While the Act does state 
that the parties shall discuss issues such as curriculum, textbooks, evaluations, 
promotions, demotions, student discipline, and class size, it adds explicitly that 
collective bargaining agreements may not contain any agreements on any of 
these topics.72
Further, while the statute allows union contracts to have grievance procedures, 
it eliminates the previous law’s authorization of binding arbitration as part of the 
grievance procedure73 and repeals the provision in the previous law that authorized 
unions and employers to arbitrate teacher dismissals.74 In addition, in 2012, 
Indiana enacted a “right to work law” (barring all forms of union security clauses) 
that applies to the public sector.75
f. MASSAchuSETTS
Chapter 69 of the Massachusetts Acts of 201176 makes it easier for local government 
employers in Massachusetts to make changes in health insurance. Under the new 
law, the governing body will list its proposed changes along with estimated cost 
savings and proof of the savings. It will then notify each bargaining unit and 
a retiree representative. The retiree representative and the bargaining unit 
representatives form a public employee committee that will bargain with the 
employer for up to thirty days. After thirty days, the matter is submitted to 
a tripartite committee, which, within ten days, can approve the employer’s 
proposed changes, reject them, or remand for additional information. The 
committee’s decision is final.
69. Ind SB 575 (2011), § 14.
70. Ibid, § 15.
71. Ibid, § 13.
72. Ibid, § 18.
73. Ibid, § 17.
74. Ibid, § 6.
75. Mary Beth Schneider & Chris Sikich, “Indiana Becomes Rust Belt’s First Right to Work 
State” USA Today (20 February 2012), online: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
story/2012-02-01/indiana-right-to-work bill/52916356/1>.
76. An Act Relative to Municipal Health Insurance, Mass Acts, c 69 (2011).
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g. MichigAn
Michigan enacted the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability 
Act, 2011,77 which allows the governor to appoint an “emergency manager” for 
local governments experiencing a “financial emergency.” The manager can reject, 
modify, or terminate any terms of contracts with public-sector unions. This law 
has proven very controversial. Local governments controlled by Democrats protest 
that the Republican governor, Rick Snyder, is essentially taking over what should 
rightfully be locally controlled decisions—or extorting concessions by threatening 
to do so.78 In May 2012, a court of appeals in Michigan upheld this Act against 
a challenge that it violated Michigan’s “open meetings” law.79
A separate Michigan law80 limited the scope of bargaining for public school 
employees. Among other things, under this law, educational employers and 
employees may not bargain over placement of teachers, reductions in force 
and recalls, performance evaluation systems, the content and implementation 
of policies regarding employee discharge or discipline, or how performance 
evaluation is used to determine employee compensation.
In March 2012, Michigan enacted a law providing that union dues for teachers 
and other public school employees in Michigan may no longer be collected through 
payroll deductions. The law also requires unions to file independent audits of 
expenditures for collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance 
adjustment with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, which must 
publish the audits on its website.81
Also in March 2012, in a separate bill, Michigan barred organizing by 
Graduate Assistants at Michigan public universities.82 This law passed both 
Houses of the Michigan legislature on party lines but was challenged in court. In 
April 2012, a judge in Michigan issued a temporary injunction against this bill 
(and several others) on grounds relating to the procedure used in the Michigan 
77. Mich HB 4214, Mich Act 4 (2011).
78. See e.g. Huff Post Emergency Manager (10 June 2012), online: <http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/news/detroit-emergency-manager>.
79. Rick Pluta, “Court of Appeals Rules that Emergency Manager Process Doesn’t Violate Open 
Meetings Law” Michigan Radio (22 May 2012), online: <http://michiganradio.org/post/
court-appeals-rules-michigans-emergency-manager-process-doesnt-violate-open-meetings-
law>.
80. Mich HB 4628, Mich Act 103 (2011).
81. Mich HB 4929, Mich Act 53 (2011).
82. Mich HB 4246, Mich Act 45 (2011).
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legislature to pass it.83 A week later, a court of appeals stayed the injunction pending 
an appeal.84 The appeal was still pending as of this writing.
Also in April 2012, Michigan passed a law, SB-1018 (PA 76), that blocks 
home-based caregivers from representation by public-sector unions.85 Specifically, 
the law changes the definition of a public employee to exclude anyone who 
receives a government subsidy for private employment. It was designed to end 
dues collection by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which 
since 2006 had been acting as the bargaining representative for home health aides 
who care for people receiving Medicaid benefits. The Michigan Department of 
Community Health pays these workers.86
Further, in 2012, Michigan passed a “right to work” law, barring the use of 
union security agreements in both the public and private sectors.87
h. nEBrASkA
Legislative Bill 39788 changed Nebraska’s interest arbitration rules to be more 
favourable to public employers. In Nebraska, the Commission of Industrial 
Relations (CIR), not private arbitrators, performs interest arbitration. The new 
Nebraska law provides detailed criteria for selecting the group of “comparable” 
communities for interest arbitrations. It also mandates that if the employer 
83. The court objected to a procedural legislative manoeuver that Michigan House Republicans 
used to pass over five hundred bills, including the bar on graduate assistant organizing. 
The bills all provide that they take effect as soon as the governor signs them. State House 
Democrats sued, claiming that the Republican leadership ignored their requests for votes 
to delay implementation of the bills, and that this improperly cut off the right of the 
people to petition for a referendum to stop the law from taking effect. Also, the state 
constitution states that a roll call “shall” be conducted whenever requested by one-fifth 
of the House members, but Republicans have repeatedly not recognized roll call motions 
from the Democrats. Ingham County Circuit Court Judge Clinton Canady granted a 
temporary injunction blocking implementation of three bills, including GA law. See Chad 
Livengood & Kim Kozlowski, “Ruling Halts Unionizing Ban for Grad Student Lab Aides” 
Detroit News (3 April 2012), online:  <http://www.detroitnews.com/article/201204402/
POLITICS02/204030357>.
84. Associated Press, “State House Republicans Win Round in Court Over Their Use of 
‘Immediate Effect’” Michigan Radio (9 April 2012), online: <http://michiganradio.org/post/
state-house-republicans-win-round-court-over-their-use-immediate-effect>.
85. Mich SB 1018, Mich Act 76 (2012).
86. Nora Macaluso, “Michigan Governor Signs Bill Ending Union Representation for Home 
Care Givers” (2012) 69 DLR A-10 (BNA).
87. Nora Macaluso, “Bills Speed Through Legislature to Make Michigan a “Right-to-Work” 
State,” (2012) 50 GERR 1485 (BNA).
88. Neb LB 397 (2011).
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pays compensation between 98 per cent and 102 per cent of the average of the 
comparable communities, then the CIR must leave compensation as it is. If the 
compensation is below 98 per cent of the average, then the CIR must order it 
raised to 98 per cent; if it is above 102 per cent, the CIR must order it lowered 
to 102 per cent. The targets are reduced to 95-100 per cent during periods of 
recession (defined as two consecutive quarters in which the state’s net sales and 
use taxes, and individual and corporate income tax receipts, are below those of 
the prior year).
i. nEVADA
Nevada enacted SB-98.89 This law reduces the number of public employee 
supervisors eligible for collective bargaining and eliminates collective bargaining 
rights for doctors and lawyers.90 The law also mandates that labour contracts 
contain clauses91 that reopen such contracts during fiscal emergencies. This law 
applies only to local governments, as state employees in Nevada do not have 
collective bargaining rights.
J. nEW hAMPShirE
New Hampshire enacted SB-1, which eliminates the requirement that the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement automatically continue if an impasse is not 
resolved at time the agreement expires.92 It also enacted HB-589,93 which repealed 
a 2007 state law that provided for mandatory card check recognition (i.e., 
mandatory union certification when a majority of the employees in a bargaining 
unit sign cards indicating they want a specific union to represent them). Such a 
provision was very controversial when the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) was 
being debated in Congress; EFCA would have applied mandatory card check 
recognition to private-sector unions under the NLRA. Less well-known is the 
fact that a number of states had already adopted mandatory card-check recognition 
in their public-sector laws (California, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Massachusetts, and Oregon).94 New Hampshire, however, has now 
repealed this rule.
89. Nev SB 98 (2011).
90. Ibid, §§ 5-6.
91. Ibid, § 7(2)(w).
92. NH SB 1 (2011).
93. NH HB 589 (2011).
94. Malin, Hodges & Slater, supra note 11 at 412.
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k. nEW JErSEy
In 2010, New Jersey adopted chapter 105 of the New Jersey Laws 2010.95 This 
law capped wage increases at 2 per cent for New Jersey police and firefighter 
arbitration awards for contracts expiring between 1 January 2011 and 1 April 
2014. This cap on base salaries expires on 1 April 2014. Arguably, more importantly, 
this law placed serious restrictions on interest arbitrators. Arbitrators will now 
be randomly selected (as opposed to the previous process of mutual selection); 
arbitrator compensation is limited to $1,000 per day and $7,500 per case; 
arbitrators must issue awards within forty-five days of a request for interest 
arbitration (the prior law allowed 120 days); and, quite significantly, arbitrators 
will be penalized $1,000 per day for failing to issue an award. Also, the arbitrator’s 
award may be appealed to the Public Employment Relations Commission, which 
must decide the appeal within thirty days.
In 2011, the state suspended bargaining over health care benefits for four 
years while a new statute, which will control the issue, is phased in.96 The new law 
sets a sliding scale of mandatory employee contributions to health care plans, and 
it calls for a state committee to design two public-sector health care plans: one for 
education employees and one for other public employees.
l. oklAhoMA
In HB-1593,97 Oklahoma repealed the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective 
Bargaining Act, a 2004 law that had required cities with populations of at least 
35,000 to bargain collectively with unions. The repeal leaves the decision of 
whether or not to bargain with a union to discretion of individual cities. As in 
Wisconsin, however, this change does not affect police and firefighters, who are 
covered by a separate statute.
M. TEnnESSEE
In the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011,98 Tennessee 
repealed the Educational Professional Negotiations Act, a 1974 law that had autho-
rized collective bargaining for public school teachers. Under the new Act, teachers 
are permitted only “collaborative conferencing.” Teachers will be represented by 
groups that receive 15 per cent or more of the votes in a confidential poll 
95. NJ PL, c 85, § 3 (1977).
96. NJ SB 2937, c 78 (2011).
97. Okla HB 1593 (2011).
98. Tenn Code Ann, c 378, § 49-5-601.
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rather than by one particular union.99 This is an especially intriguing provision, in 
that it rejects the exclusive, majority representative Wagner Act model ubiquitous 
in public- and private-sector labour law in the United States.
Crucially, the bill does not provide for collective bargaining rights, as 
that term has been traditionally understood. Specifically the law mandates 
“collaborative conferencing” on issues including salaries, benefits other than 
retirement benefits, working conditions, grievance procedures, leave, and payroll 
deductions.100 However, it also states that the parties are not required to reach an 
agreement on any of these issues, and adds that if no agreement is reached, the 
school board will set terms and conditions of employment through school board 
policy.101 Furthermore, the law specifically prohibits collaborative conferencing 
on a number of issues including differential pay plans, incentive compensation, 
expenditure of grants or awards, evaluations, staffing and assignment decisions, 
and payroll deductions for political activities.102
iV. ATTAckS on PuBlic-SEcTor EMPloyEE VoicE AnD 
ThE WAgnEr AcT MoDEl
A. AlTErnATiVES ThAT liMiT EMPloyEE VoicE
These attacks on public-sector bargaining rights are attempts to cripple employee 
voice. Such attempts are most obvious when they involve eliminating the right 
altogether. But employee voice at the workplace is also diminished by drastically 
limiting the scope of bargaining or permitting the employer to choose its own 
proposal at impasse. Further, efforts to cripple unions economically through 
“right to work” laws and bans on dues check-off not only encourage freeriding but 
are openly and explicitly intended to weaken union voice in the political sphere. 
These and the other restrictions described above (e.g., the absurd recertification 
system in Wisconsin) are designed to limit employee voice. Public-sector unions 
fought long and hard for formal collective bargaining rights precisely because 
they understood that absent such rights, their posture could be reduced to 
“collective begging,” as the old, derogatory term put it.103
99. Ibid, §§ 49-5-605(b)(1), (2), (4).
100. Ibid, § 49-5-608(a).
101. Ibid, § 49-5-609(d).
102. Ibid, § 49-5-608(b).
103. Slater, Public Workers, supra note 25.
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When exploring alternatives to the Wagner Act model, details and specific 
legal rights matter greatly. For example, in urging a “new governance” approach 
to workplace law, Cynthia Estlund has stressed that workers need “an effective 
collective voice in a system of self-regulation—that is, enough power to monitor 
compliance and to counter firms’ opportunistic impulses.”104 This voice, I have 
argued elsewhere, is best expressed by union collective bargaining.105
Thus, for example, limiting the scope of bargaining to wages only or to wages 
and some benefits takes away employees’ voice in key aspects of their working 
lives. Not only do workers have invaluable knowledge about their jobs and how 
to do them that can benefit the employer, but it also is a basic democratic practice 
to provide people with some form of control, as a group, over at least some of the 
rules and conditions of the place where they spend a significant portion of their 
lives. Reasonable minds may differ on how exactly to provide effective employee 
input on such issues, but greatly limiting topics of discussion (e.g., in Wisconsin, 
to wages within a certain range only) does precisely the opposite.
Limiting impasse procedures also limits voice, because it detracts from 
effective collective bargaining. For example, in Ohio, SB-5 would have taken 
away the right to strike for those public employees who had it and removed 
binding interest arbitration for those who could not strike. These procedures 
would have been replaced by a system that allowed only non-binding mediation 
and fact-finding, and permitted the employer to select its own proposals unilaterally. 
Such a system gives the employer little incentive to come to an agreement in the 
negotiating process. Rather than a vehicle for effective voice, this system more 
closely resembles the kind of “bargaining” a parent does with a child. Unions 
would have had no leverage in negotiations, effectively ending their right to 
engage in meaningful and productive bargaining.106
104. Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to Co-Regulation, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 23.
105. Slate, Employee Voice, supra note 10.
106. Also, it is not as if interest arbitration generally favours unions over employers. For example, 
historically, for firefighter and police union negotiations in Ohio that have reached an 
impasse and required arbitration, arbitrators have sided with employers about half the 
time and unions the other half. Further, the system works by encouraging the parties to 
resolve their differences short of arbitration. Only about 2 per cent of all negotiations have 
gone to arbitration since 1983, the year this law went into effect, because the existence of 
this mechanism makes both sides take negotiations seriously. Philip Stevens “Benefits of 
Bargaining: How Public Sector Negotiations Improve Ohio Communities” Policy Matters 
Ohio (15 October 2011), online: <http://www.policymattersohio.org/BenefitsofBargaining.
htm>.
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Those interested in unions and collective bargaining as vehicles for employee 
voice in the broader society should be especially alarmed at the bans on union 
security clauses and on dues check-off. Again, these rules were passed explicitly 
to limit union voice in the political sphere, with proponents claiming that 
unions are too powerful, both within the workplace and politically.107 Again, I 
have responded to these arguments elsewhere.108 The broader point is that when 
academics imagine alternatives to the Wagner Act model, we should take into 
account the very real alternatives that have been created to limit, not enhance, 
employee voice, in every way.
B. lESSonS ABouT ThE WAgnEr AcT MoDEl?
As noted above, the Wagner Act model of exclusive majority representation has 
faced increasing scrutiny and scepticism in recent years as the level of private-
sector union density in the United States continued to drop. Granted, focusing 
on the public sector may risk giving insufficient attention to the dire straits in 
which private-sector unions have found themselves, thus possibly leading to 
complacency about the basic structures of US labour law.
Nevertheless, two cautions may still be in order. First, public-sector unions 
in the United States have flourished using the Wagner Act model. While this 
does not prove that all unions could, should, or would flourish, it shows that the 
model is not inconsistent with vibrant, active unions. Second, to the extent that 
alternatives to this model may arise, those sympathetic to employee voice and 
robust collective bargaining may well not be the ones designing such alternatives. 
Thus, as with the recent public-sector laws described above, the alternatives for 
private-sector unions might well be significantly worse than the status quo. In 
short, if changes come when unions are relatively weak, it is likely that the goal of 
the changes will be to weaken unions further, not to revive them.
Take, for example, the Tennessee law for teachers described above. As noted, 
it does away with exclusive, majority representation, replacing it with a system 
in which any organization that obtains support of at least 15 per cent of eligible 
employees will become a representative of those employees. In and of itself, this 
could be considered an intriguing departure from the Wagner Act model of a 
collective bargaining representative (and, arguably, a dip into forms of representation 
featured in some European countries). A further glance at the law shows that it 
is not collective bargaining designed to facilitate employee voice at all. Rather, it 
107. See e.g. McGinnis & Schanzenbach, supra note 9; Daniel Disalvo, “The Problem with Public 
Sector Unions” (2010) 5 Nat’l Affairs; Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” supra note 1 at 192-93.
108. See generally the sources cited supra note 6. See also Slater & Welenc supra note 7.
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is “collaborative conferencing” about a very narrowly prescribed set of topics on 
which the employer has full, final, and unilateral authority.
In a coincidence that is serendipitous for the purposes of this article, both 
Canadian law and a US public-sector law have recently offered cautionary tales 
along these lines. In 2007, courts in both Missouri and Canada found that 
employees who did not have a statutory right to engage in collective bargaining 
nonetheless had a constitutional right to bargain collectively. But what “collective 
bargaining” means has been contested in both jurisdictions and the promise of 
these holdings has been undermined by parties who do not wish to promote 
effective employee voice through collective bargaining.
c. ThE MiSSouri conSTiTuTionAl righT To collEcTiVE BArgAining
In 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court held that public employees have a right 
under the Missouri state Constitution to bargain collectively. Specifically, the court 
held that a clause added to the state Constitution in 1945 stating that, “employees 
shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing” applies to public employees.109 This reversed a 1947 
decision by the Missouri Supreme Court, which had held that this clause did not 
apply to public employees.110 Because Missouri’s state public-sector labour statute 
excludes significant categories of public employees (e.g., police and teachers), the 
2007 decision means that large swaths of public workers in Missouri have a right 
to bargain collectively only by virtue of the state Constitution. The precise nature 
of that right remains unclear, however. The Court did not explain what exactly 
this right means, and the state has not passed a statute attempting to enact the 
right. I have discussed these cases and related issues in greater detail elsewhere.111
What is relevant here is that, in the wake of this decision, some Missouri 
public employers, claiming they are complying with the mandate to permit 
collective bargaining, have enacted systems that are far removed from traditional 
understandings of collective bargaining in the United States. These systems do 
not seem conducive to employee voice. I was involved as a witness in two cases in 
which unions challenged such systems.
First, in Springfield Nat’l Educ Ass’n v Sch Dist Of Springfield,112 the local 
school board created a system for union recognition that allowed multiple unions 
109. Independence-Nat’l Educ Ass’n v Independence Sch Dist, 223 SW 3d 131, 181 LRRM 3224 
(Mo 2007).
110. City of Springfield v Clouse, 356 Mo 1239, 206 SW 2d 539 (Mo 1947).
111. Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” supra note 1 at 225-28.
112. No 0931-CV08322 (Cir Ct Greene County, 2009) [Springfield].
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to represent the same group of teachers. Under this system, union representation 
elections would be held in two stages. In the first stage, teachers in a bargaining 
unit would vote on whether they wished to be represented by a single union, 
multiple unions, or no unions.113 The “multiple union” option obviously was 
contrary to the Wagner Act model, but it also was not what union-friendly 
advocates of alternatives to this model envision. Unlike the minority union 
bargaining that Charlie Morris describes in his book The Blue Eagle,114 the 
Springfield system did not just attack the majority union requirement. Rather, 
the Springfield system permitted non-exclusive representation. Multiple unions 
could represent the same employees at the same time, with no explanation of 
how this would work if the different unions had competing or inconsistent goals 
or strategies.
The judge in the Springfield case permitted this system to go forward. He 
relied heavily on a dictionary definition of “collective bargaining” that defined 
that term as “negotiation… between an employer or group of employers on one 
side and a union or number of unions on the other.”115 I have criticized the legal 
reasoning in this case elsewhere, and noted that it was not appealed because the 
affected teachers voted for the “one union representative” model after this decision.116
Most relevant here is that again, this alternative to the Wagner Act model 
was not designed to facilitate employee voice. Indeed, it seemed fairly clear to 
me, while watching the testimony at trial, that the employer’s goal in creating this 
system was to undermine the independent teachers’ union (a union supported by 
a majority of teachers) by creating a system that could  allow a different, minority 
group (one that was conservative and allied with the employer) an equal claim 
to representation.
The second Missouri case was Bayless Educ Ass’n v Bayless Sch Dist.117 In 
Bayless, the employer—another public school system—attempted to impose a 
different type of alternative to the Wagner Act model. Specifically, the employees 
in each school in the district were instructed to select two individual representatives 
and two alternates from that school. These representatives, plus an additional 
representative to be selected by the union with the largest employee membership in 
113. Ibid, slip op at 12.
114. Morris, supra note 14.
115. Springfield, supra note 112, slip op at 12-13.
116. Slater, “Public-Sector Labor,” supra note 1 at 226-27.
117. No 09SL-CC01481 (Cir Ct St Louis County, 2010).
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the district would then bargain, as a group, with the employer. Again, there was 
no requirement that the individual members of this group have any particular 
goals in common, and no explanation of how differences among group members 
should or could be resolved.118
In Bayless, the judge held that this system did not satisfy the constitutional 
right to bargain collectively, explaining that this system “mandates collaborative 
bargaining, not collective bargaining” but failing to define either term.119 Again, 
the relevant point here is that it seems unlikely that the employer created this 
system to maximize employee voice. Litigation is likely to continue in Missouri, with 
employers and unions having very different goals when contemplating alternatives to 
the Wagner Act model and in defining “collective bargaining” generally.
D. ThE cAnADiAn conSTiTuTionAl righT To collEcTiVE BArgAining
In 2007, in the Health Services case, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the right to freedom of association in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms120 “protects the capacity of members of labour unions to engage 
in collective bargaining on workplace issues.”121 This case, like the Missouri 
Supreme Court decision discussed above, extended largely undefined “collective 
bargaining” rights to workers who previously did not enjoy such rights under 
existing statutes. Then, in 2011, the highly fractured Fraser opinion at least 
arguably undercut some of the protections Health Services seemed to promise.122 
Experts in Canadian law have discussed both Health Services and Fraser in detail 
elsewhere.123 The point here, again, is that alternatives to the Wagner Act model 
in the real world are being influenced by those not sympathetic to the goal of 
increasing effective employee voice.
Fraser involved agricultural workers in Ontario, who are excluded from that 
province’s general labour relations statute. In the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Fraser, the judge (a former employer-side labour lawyer), explained that:
118. Ibid, slip op at 5.
119. Ibid, slip op at 8.
120. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), c 11 [Charter].
121. Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 
SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 at para 35 [Health Services].
122. Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2011] 2 SCR 3 [Fraser SCC].
123. See e.g. Judy Fudge, “Constitutional Rights, Collective Bargaining and the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Retreat and Reversal in the Fraser Case” (2012) 41 Indus LJ; Eric Tucker, “Labour’s 
Many Constitutions (and Capital’s Too)” (2012) 33 Comp Lab LJ 355.
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At a minimum, the following statutory protections are required to enable agricultural 
workers to exercise their right to bargain collectively in a meaningful way: (1) a 
statutory duty to bargain in good faith; (2) a statutory recognition of the principles 
of exclusivity and majoritarianism; and (3) a statutory mechanism for resolving 
bargaining impasses and disputes regarding the interpretation or administration of 
collective agreements.124
However, at least most of the opinions in the Supreme Court Fraser decision 
do not fully embrace the principle that the Charter requires all of these features 
(which are at least key components of the Wagner Act model). The opinion of 
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel stresses, “bargaining activities protected 
by section 2(d) in the labour relations context include good faith bargaining on 
important workplace issues.”125 But this opinion also rejects the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion to the extent that it “constitutionalizes a full-blown Wagner system of 
collective bargaining.”126
Meanwhile, Justice Rothstein would have overruled Health Services, thus 
mooting the question of what model of collective bargaining should be used.127 
Like some critics of public-sector bargaining in the United States, he argued 
that collective bargaining rights unjustifiably privilege certain organizations (i.e., 
unions) over others.128 Justice Deschamps would not have overturned Health 
Services, but also would not have found a duty to bargain in good faith.129 On 
the other hand, Justice Abella held that the Charter’s guarantees encompass 
not only the duty to bargain in good faith, but also the principle of exclusive, 
majority representation.130
The future contours of the constitutional right to collective bargaining in 
Canada thus remain somewhat unclear, but advocates for unions have generally not 
been celebrating Fraser. Judy Fudge concludes that the decision “is not surprising, but 
it is disappointing.”131 Eric Tucker writes that Fraser “seemingly signals a retreat.”132 
It is beyond the scope of this article (and this author’s expertise) to make specific 
predictions in this area. Again, though, the point is that the alternatives to the 
Wagner Act model that are being developed may not lead to greater worker voice, 
124. Fraser v Ontario (Attorney General), 2008 ONCA 760, [2008] 92 OR (3d) 481. See also 
Fudge, supra note 123.
125. Fraser SCC, supra note 122 at 34.
126. Ibid at 44-45; Fudge, supra note 123 at 19.
127. Fraser SCC, supra note 122 at 149, 159-65.
128. Ibid at 203-18. See also, Fudge, supra note 123 at 19.
129. Fraser SCC, supra note 122, at 300-01; Fudge, supra note 123 at 20.
130. Fraser SCC, supra note 122 at 327, 335; Fudge, supra note 123 at 21.
131. Fudge, supra note 123 at 27.
132. Tucker, supra note 123 at 361.
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however that may be defined. Employers, judges, politicians, and others not 
sympathetic to unions will inevitably have a role in crafting these alternatives.
V. concluSion
All this does not mean that any alternative to the Wagner Act model in the 
United States (or Canada) is doomed to fail, or even that alternatives are not 
worth trying. Certainly, not all lessons from the public sector can be mechanical-
ly mapped onto the private sector, or vice-versa. But these experiences do provide 
a caution to those (understandably) searching for alternatives.
The relative success of public-sector unions in the United States is undoubtedly 
due partly to the relative lack of the aggressive anti-union tactics that have long 
been a feature of private-sector labour law. Perhaps it is true that the Wagner Act 
model works well only in the absence of such tactics. But this does not show that 
alternative models will work in the face of such attacks, or that choosing alternative 
models will stop such attacks.
Instead, it shows that attempts to reinvent US labour law in a paradigm 
outside the Wagner Act model should think about what has made public-sector 
unions in the United States more successful than private-sector unions in recent 
decades. As to legal rules, I have argued elsewhere that the general default rule 
of “at-will” employment (under which employees may be fired for any reason not 
made specifically illegal, or for no reason at all), hurts private-sector unionization 
attempts in the United States because employees have the burden of proof of 
showing anti-union motivation in discharges. This burden is often not easy to 
carry. In contrast, most public employees covered by collective-bargaining laws 
in the United States are also covered by civil service laws that provide “just-cause” 
discharge protection, shifting the burden to the employer to show cause for 
dismissal. This makes it more difficult for an employer to discharge an employee 
for union-related reasons.133 Also, remedies for employer violations of the NLRA 
(reinstatement and back pay minus what the employee earned or should have 
earned) have proven inadequate to deter employer violations of employee and 
union rights in the private sector.134 It is likely that increasing these penalties 
significantly would help deter such acts.135 In short, before giving up on the 
133. Slater, “The ‘American Rule’,” supra note 18 at 88-93.
134. Ibid at 79-82.
135. This was the premise of one of the provisions in US, Bill HR 1409, Employee Free Choice Act, 
111th Cong, 2009, which Democrats had hopes for early in President Obama’s first term but 
has thus far failed to pass.
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Wagner Act model, advocates might consider simply trying to make the Wagner 
Act model function as it was designed to function, by reforming private sector 
labour laws to prevent routine, intentional violation of the NLRA’s core provisions 
by employers. These reforms could include a general just-cause protection rule or 
significantly stiffer remedies for certain unfair labour practices.
One might object that such reforms are not likely, at least in the short-
term. But the realpolitik reason this is true should give reformers caution about 
abandoning the Wagner Act model. Recent experiences in the public sector 
show that in a time of relative union weakness—and the related ascendency of 
an ideology that rejects even basic industrial relations theories of union utility—
alternatives may be thrust upon the labour movement that are obviously worse 
than the Wagner Act model from the perspective of workers and unions. Indeed, 
in many cases, they are intended to be worse. We are in an era, as Tucker puts it, 
of “a neoliberal agenda, which sees labour rights as market impeding, that has 
motivated efforts to put labour rights beyond the reach of ordinary government 
action.”136 Advocates of worker voice, in considering the feasibility of developing 
new models of employee representation, should take seriously the strength of 
the opposition.
136. Tucker, supra note 123 at 355.

